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1. DEFECTS IN THE ESTIMATES
I should note at the outset that many defects exist in the statistical estimates
that are used in the field under discussion. The estimates most often cited come
fr9m the OECD, which purport to show, for December 1977, a discrepancy of more
than $88 billion over the years 1974-1977 ($22 billion a year) between the current
account surpluses of the OPEC countries ($175 billion) and the accumulated deficits
of the rest of the world ($264 billion) [4, p. 64]. This discrepancy is almost equal
to the total deficits of the OECD countries during that period ($98 billion). There
appear to be discrepancies of the same order of magnitude in the estimates of the
transfers of capital and monetary r~servesbetween various countries.
I must ask you, therefore, to take the followingobservations with severalgrains
- rather several bags - of salt, the more so since they are based on estimates from
different sources which are not completely comparable. Undoubtedly the services
of the World Bank - considerably more substantial than those of a professor on
sabbatical leave - could make a significant improvement in the observations.
I,'.
2. GEOGRAPHICALSTRUCTUREOF THE IMBALANCES
OF CURRENT ACCOUNT
My only observation is that the geographical structure of the deficits on
current account is the worst imaginable from the human and economic standpoints.
The richest and most capitalized countries in the world should normally have large
surpluses on their current accounts (1 percent of their GNP, according to the pious
wishes constantly reiterated at the United Nations) allowingthem to finance, in real
terms, an acceleration of investment for development in the poorest and least capital-
*The author is Professor of Economics at the Yale University. This paper was originally
published in French in the Revue Economique, Vol. 29, No.6 (November 1978). It was kindly
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ized countries of the Third World. The situation today is exactly the opposite, and
promises to remain so in the foreseeable future also.
The OECD countries have accumulated, over the last four years, net deficits
totalling nearly $100 billion, that is to say about $25 billion a year on average. Four
years after the oil price explosion, they incurred in 1977 a record deficit of about
$32 billion, comprising $18 billion in surpluses for Japan ($10 billion) and a handful
of European countries ($8 billion) against $50 billion of deficits, including $18
billion for the United States and $13 billion for three of the other richest countries
in the world - Canada, Norway and Sweden.
The energy crisis is undoubtedly one of the explanations of this unacceptable
paradox, but it is disconcerting to note that not only there has been no improvement
in the situation even after four years, but the situation has actually worsened.
Indeed, both economists and politicians apparently viewwith equanimity the persis-
tence of such deficits; they even recommend it as the best available solution to the
present recession.
The financing of these deficits surely implies that the developed countries are,
and will remain, the principal importers of capital which should normally be directed
mainly to those countries that are the least developed and the most short of capital.
in German marks, 1*percent in sterling, and the rest in other currencies, principally
Swissfrancs, Dutch guilders and French francs, at the end of 1977 [2, p. 155].2
One can conclude from these IMF estimates that the developed countries have
incurred in the last six years global deficits (on current account plus net exports of
capital) of $98 billion ($17 billion in the period 1970-1973, and $80 billion in the
1974-1977 period). At the same time, the gross reservesof these countries have in-
creased by $126 billion as a result of the $223 billion of monetary reservesinvested
in their markets.
On the other hand, the oil-exporting countries, having received none of these
investments, have increased their net reserves by the same amount as their gross
reserves,Le. by $71 billion, including $10 billion in the period 1970-1973 and $61
billion in the 1974-1977 period. Their reserveshave grown nineteen times in eight
years, from $4 billion in 1969 to $75 billion in 1977. The net reserve position of
the other developing countries has itself more ttJan quadrupled, rising from $11
billion in 1969 to $26 billion in 1973 and to $45 billion in 1977 Undoubtedly, this
growth is explained in part by the deposits maintained by the monetary authorities
with commercial banks as a condition for a substantial increase in loans by these
latter banks to the developingcountries (see section 5 below).
3. FINANCINGBY MONETARYAUTHORITIES
The national and international monetary institutions have certainly not set a
good example in this field: They have permitted or facilitated an inflationary quad-
rupling of the world monetary reserves, which rose from $79 billion at the end of
1969to $317billionat the endof 1977. Thismeans'thatin eightyearsthe volume
of reserves has increased by three times the level achieved in all previous history.
But of this total increase of $238 billion, less than 3 percent ($7 billion) has been in-
vested in the developing countries and nearly 94 percent ($223 billion) in the de-
veloped countries.l This is above all due to the fact that the prind gal source of
increase in global gross reserves (88 percent) has come from the accumulation of
national currencies by central banks as international reserves. The ownership of
these kinds of reserves has increased more than six times in eight years, but they are
invested almost exclusively in the currencies of a small number of the richest
countries in the world: more than 81 percent in dollars and Euro-dollars, 7 percent
4. OFFICIAL FINANCINGOF DEVEWPMENT
Based on the OECD statistics, the offiCialaid and other official capital flows
not classifiedas "aid" constituted, during the years 1970-1973, the principal source
of global financingof the Third World (excludin"gOPEC)deficits on current account.
These official flows amounted to $41 billion or 79 percent of the current account
deficits of $52 billion excluding free transfers. However, in the following four
years, official flows constituted no more than 57 percent ($88 billion out of $154
billion) of the deficit fmancing required.
It will be noted that these official capital exports by the developed countries to
the developingcountries have, over the last eight years, constituted no more than 58
percent ($129 billion) of the capital received by the former countries in the form of
investments of monetary reserves in their capital markets: in the case of the United
States, it wasonly 30 percent.3
lThe remaining 3 percent is the result of the revaluation from $35 to $42.22 an ounce of
the global gold reserves, whose volume has remained essentially unchanged at 40.5 billion SDRs
valued at 35 SDRs per ounce in 1977 as in 1969. The market value of this gold has increased
nearly 5 times, but this has not yet been registered in the offiqial statistics. In any event, the
gold holdings of the developing countries (OPEC and others) is insignificant: less than 3.1 million
SDRs at the end of 1977.
S. PRIVATE FINANCING
According to the same OECD statistics, the financing of the Third World by
the private sector - measured in dollars whose purchasing power has unfortunately
been decreasing - has tripled from 1970-1973 to 1974-1977, while fmancingby
2The role of the mark has grown from 2.1 percent in 1970 to 6.9 percent in 1977, while
that of the sterling has declined from 9 percent to 1.5 percent over the same period.
3$41 billion in external assistance, agllinst $118 billion of monetary reserve investments in
the U. S. and in foreign branches of American banks ($26 billion) and $28 billion of SDR alloca-
tion.
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the public sector has only doubled over the same period. Direct investments have
doubled, portfolio investments tripled, and medium-term Euro-credits have increased
fivefold, this last category alone financing about 23 percent of the current account
deficits in the period 1974-1978, and as much as 30 percent in 1977.
At the end of 1977, short-term and-medium-term Euro-credits recorded by
the Bank for International Settlements totalled $657 billion, of which $92 billion
(14 percent) were to the non-oil-exporting developing countries [1], in contrast to
$442 billion and $63 billion (also 14 percent) respectively at the end of 1975.
This growing role of the private bank credits in the financing of the Third
World development, however encouraging it may be, still causes some uneasiness:
(a) On the global scene, the sixfold growth of the Euro-currency market over
seven years is in marked contrast to the paralysisof the international capi-
tal markets which characterized the great recession in the Thirties, but it is
also undoubtedly one of the principal causes of the inflation in which we
are currently engulfed. The simultaneous struggle against inflation and
recession should be reinforced by .an orientation of international credits
to those investments that are most likely to cure shortages of production
materials that are most p.ssentialand cause most inflation, and also to the
worst pockets of recession and unemployment. That would require an
official effort to direct private capital movements which are today largely
uncontrolled. Most particularly, it would require control of offshore
operations, which have grown many times in size since 1969 particularly
through branches of American banks, and whose extraordinary growth is
explained above all by the desire to avoid national regulations and taxes.
One can only be surprised that the numerous discussions between mone-
tary authorities have barely touched on this problem.
Concerning the financing of the developing countries, one must ask if this
source of credit is likely to continue at the rate of recent years; and also
what the impact of a substantial retrenchment would be on the liquidity
or even on the solvency of the borrowers. Besides the apprehensions
raised in this regard by the excessive indebtedness of certain countries,
such a slowing could be brought about also by the success of efforts to
stimulate economic activity in the developed countries. In effect, one of
the incentives for bank loans to the Third World has been the diminution
of credit demands by nationals of the developed countries which have
been in recession and .whichhave received an influx of investments to their
banking systems from the OPEC countries.
One final point, already forcefully underlined by Mr. MacNamara,deserves
to be reiterated. More than 96 percent of the private sector loans have
been made to middle-income countries, while less than 4 percent (in con-
trast to the 32 percent of official loans) have gone to the poorest
countries, Le. those with per: capita incomes of less than $265 in
1975. These poorest countries comprise a total population of 1,132
million, compared with 799 million in the other develrping countries
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6. CONCLUSIONS
These few remarks are so brief that they could easily forgo conclusions. I will
content myself with a dual observation that is more political than economic.
We should applaudthe demonstratedcapacityof the privatemarket - most
notably the Euro-currency market - to assume a major role in the recyclingof sur-
pluses of the oil producers, and to direct a growing, though still modest, part of these
surpluses towards the developingcountries.
But one can only deplore the inability of the official sector to remedy the
fundamental, though universally recognised, weaknesses of the international
monetary system, which is now vergingon chaos. The official sector has also been
unable to provide the direction that is essential to the proper functioning of the
operations of the private sector. Our host during this conference, the World Bank,
provides an exception to these comments which deservesencouragement and con-
gratulations.
Source: Derived from "International Reserve Estimates" in [3, pp. 20 - 25 J.
1For the world this equals the global stock of monetary gold, vllIued at the last official
price of $42.22 per ounce: for each country or group of countries, it equals their global balance
of payments.




International Monetary Reserves and Distribution of
GlobalStructure of Ot"ent Account Balanceof Payments their Investment by GeographicalArea: 1969- 77
(after transfers): 1970- 73and 1974- 77 (billions of dollars)
(billions of dollars)
Total Ann ual Averages Annual Year-end Changes




of (=II+III+IV) 79 184 317 105 133 238I. OPEC 16 175 4 44 40 35
Developed coun-
II. OECD 18 -98 - -24 -32 -23 tries 63 140 189 77 49 126
U.S.A. -15 -10 -4 -3 -18 -I 9 Oil-exporters 4 15 75 10 61 71
Japan 14 8 4 2 10 10 Other countries 12 30 53 18 23 41
Germany 7 19 2 5 2 3 II. Foreign currencySwitzerland 1 10 - 2 3 4
Owed by theBenelux 3 6 I 2 1 2 developed
Others 7 -130 2 -32 -30 -22 countries 33 123 242 90 119 209
III. Non-oil-exporting III. SDR allocations
developingcountries -31 -114 -8 -28 -23 -34 and IMF credits 5 13 27 7 15 22
IV. Other countries -12 -52 -3 -13 -11 -12 Developed coun-tries 4 9 18 5 10 14
V. Total = E"ors Oil-exporters - - - - - -and Omissions -9 -89 -2 -22 -26 -33 Other countries 1 4 8 2 5 7
Source: [4, pp. 64, 65 and 126) IV. Net Reserves 1 of
(=I-ll-III) 41 49 48 8 -1 7
Developed coun-
tries 26 8 -72 -17 -80 -98
Oil-exporters 4 14 75 10 61 71
Other coun-
tries 11 26 45 15 19 34
Ilil
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Foreign Credits and Debts through Comnrercial Banks at end - 1977
(billions of dollars)
Balanceof Poynrentsof Non-OPEC Developing Countries: 1970- 77
(billions of dollars)
Total
1970- 73 1974 1970-77
I. Current account balance
(excluding official transfers) -52 -154 -206
II
II II. External financing 67 170 237
II
A. Official 41 88 129
.II
1. Grants 21 41 62
'1111 2. Aid loans 13 29 42"
3. Other 8 18 26
B. Private 26 82 108
1. Direct investments 9 17 26
2. Portfolio investments 6 17 23
3. Medium-term Euro-credits 7 36 43
4. Commercialcredits, repayment of
Euro-credits, errors and omissions 4 12 16
III. Net monetary reserves (I-II) 15 16 31
A. Indebtedness ( - ) -2 -6 -8
B. Gross reserves 17 21 39
Source: [4,p.121]
Countries/Organizations Credits Debts Net Positions
(-)
I. Net Creditor Countries 540 -433 107
European Group-of- Ten 290 -240 50
Oil-exporters 78 -35 42
USA(including offshore) 145 -137 8
International institutions
and non -allocated residual 14 -9 5
Canada 13 -12 1
II. Net Debtor Countries 119 -224 . -106
Non-oil-exporting developing
countries 63 -92 -29
Other developed countries 41 -70 -29
Eastern Europe -33 -24
Japan 7 -29 -22
III. Total 658 -657 1
Source: [1, Table 6: External position, in domestic and foreign currencies,of the banks of





ForeignIndebtedness of Developing Countries
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1973 95 79 16
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1. 1969-1973: [6, pp. 110 and 111]. Includes 81 developing countries other than the net
creditor oil-exporting countries: Kuwait, Libya,' Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab
Emirates.
The poor countries comprise a population of 1132 'million with an average per capita
income of $265 in 1975, while the other countries have a population of 799 million with an
average per capita income above $265. See [6, p. 2J.
Excludes from total indebtedness ($224 billion at the end of 1976) the compensatory and
oil facilities of the IMF ($5 billion) and loans with a maturity ofless than one year ($50 billion)
of which $6 billion is in the public sector while the rest is in the private sector. See [6, p. 64 J.
Credits from American banks and their branches to the non-oil-exporting developing
countries were estimated to be $52 billion at the end of 1976, while credits to other countries
were estimated at $174 billion. See [6, p. 102]. .
2. 1976: [5]. Includes all debts with maturities greater than one year for 85 developing
co untries.
The poor countries are defined as those with per capita income less than $280 at the end
of 1976.
3. Regulatory agencies in the United States estimated that the credits from 124 major bank-
ing organizations in the U. S. carrying the greatest risks Ooans from the banking organization in
one' country to a borrower in another country in a currency other than that of the borrower)
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